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Abstract
The next bit test was introduced by Blum and Micali and proved by Yao to be a universal test
for cryptographic pseudorandom generators. On the other hand, no universal test for the crypto-
graphic one-wayness of functions (or permutations) is known, although the existence of cryptographic
pseudorandom generators is equivalent to that of cryptographic one-way functions. In the quantum
computation model, Kasheﬁ, Nishimura and Vedral gave a sufﬁcient condition of (cryptographic)
quantum one-way permutations and conjectured that the condition would be necessary. In this paper,
we afﬁrmatively settle their conjecture and complete a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for quantum
one-way permutations. The necessary and sufﬁcient condition can be regarded as a universal test
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for quantum one-way permutations, since the condition is described as a collection of stepwise tests
similar to the next bit test for pseudorandom generators.
© 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
One-way functions are functions f such that, for each x, f (x) is efﬁciently computable
but f−1(y) is computationally tractable only for a negligible fraction of all y’s. While the
modern cryptography depends heavily on one-way functions, the existence of one-way
functions is one of the most important open problems in theoretical computer science. On
the other hand, Shor [14] showed that famous candidates of one-way functions such as
the RSA function or the discrete logarithm function are no longer one-way in the quantum
computation model. Nonetheless, some cryptographic applications based on quantum one-
way functions have been considered (see, e.g., [1,5]).
As a cryptographic primitive other than one-way functions, pseudorandom generators
have been studied well. Blum and Micali [3] proposed how to construct pseudorandom
generators from one-way permutations and introduced the next bit test for pseudorandom
generators. (They actually constructed a pseudorandom generator assuming the hardness of
the discrete logarithm problem.) SinceYao [15] proved that the next bit test is a universal test
for pseudorandom generators, the Blum–Micali construction paradigm of pseudorandom
generators from one-way permutations was proved to work properly. In the case of pseu-
dorandom generators based on one-way permutations, the next bit unpredictability can be
proved by using hard-core predicates for one-way permutations. After that, Goldreich and
Levin [8] showed that there exists a hard-core predicate for any one-way function (and also
permutation) and Håstad et al. [10] showed that the existence of pseudorandom generators
is equivalent to that of one-way functions.
Yao’s result on the universality of the next bit test assumes that all bits appearing among
the pseudorandom bits are computationally unbiased. Schrift and Shamir [13] extended
Yao’s result to the biased case and proposed universal tests for non-uniform distributions.
On the other hand, no universal test for the one-wayness of a function (or a permutation)
is known, although pseudorandom generators and one-way functions (or permutations) are
closely related.
In the quantum computation model, Kasheﬁ et al. [11] gave a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for the existence of worst-case quantum one-way permutations. They also con-
sidered the cryptographic (i.e., average-case) quantum one-way permutations and gave a
sufﬁcient condition of (cryptographic) quantum one-way permutations, and posed a con-
jecture that the condition would be necessary. Their conditions are based on the efﬁcient
implementability of reﬂection operators about some class of quantum states. Note that the
reﬂection operators are successfully used in the Grover algorithm [9] and the quantum
amplitude ampliﬁcation technique [4]. To obtain a sufﬁcient condition of cryptographic
quantum one-way permutations, a notion of “pseudo identity” operators was introduced
372 A. Kawachi et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 345 (2005) 370–385
[11]. Since the worst-case hardness of reﬂection operators is concerned with the worst-case
hardness of the inversion of the permutation f, we need some technical tool with which the
inversion process of f becomes tolerant of some computational errors in order to obtain
a sufﬁcient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations. Actually, pseudo
identity operators permit exponentially small errors during the inversion process [11].
In this paper, we complete a necessary and sufﬁcient condition of cryptographic quantum
one-way permutations conjectured in [11]. We incorporate their basic ideas with a prob-
abilistic argument in order to obtain a technical tool to permit polynomially small errors
during the inversion process. Roughly speaking, pseudo identity operators are close to the
identity operator in a sense. The similarity is deﬁned by an intermediate notion between
the statistical distance and the computational distance. In [11], it is “by upper-bounding
the similarity” that the sufﬁcient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permuta-
tions was obtained. By using a probabilistic argument, we can estimate the expectation
of the similarity and then handle polynomially small errors during the inversion of the
permutation f.
Moreover, the necessary and sufﬁcient condition of quantum one-way permutations can
be regarded as a universal test for the quantum one-wayness of permutations. To discuss
universal tests for the one-wayness of permutations, we brieﬂy review the universality of
the next bit test for pseudorandom generators. Let g(x) be a length-regular deterministic
function such that g(x) is of length (n) for any x of length n. The universality of the
next bit test says that we have only to check a collection of stepwise polynomial-time tests
T1, . . . , T(n) instead of considering all the polynomial-time tests that try to distinguish the
truly random bits from output bits from g, where each Ti is the test whether, given the
(i − 1)-bit preﬁx of g(x) (and the value of (|x|)), the ith bit of g(x) is predictable or not
with probability non-negligibly higher than 12 . Our necessary and sufﬁcient condition of
quantum one-way permutations says that the quantum one-wayness of a given permutation
f can be checked by a collection of stepwise tests T ′1, . . . , T ′n instead of considering all the
tests of polynomial-size quantum circuit, where each T ′i is the test whether, given some
quantum state qi−1 that can be deﬁned by using the (i − 1)-bit preﬁx of f (x), some other
quantity ti is computable with polynomial-size quantum circuit or not and the next state qi
can be determined from qi−1 and ti . In this sense, our universal test for quantum one-way
permutations is analogous to the universal test (i.e., the next bit test) for pseudorandom
generators.
2. Preliminaries
Since our study is an extension of the results by Kasheﬁ et al. [11], we use the same
notions, deﬁnitions and notations. In this section, we describe them and review the results
in [11].
2.1. Notations and basic operators
We say that a unitary operator U (on n qubits) is easy if there exists a quantum circuit
implementing U of size polynomial in n. Similarly, a set F of unitary operators is easy if
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Fig. 1. Reﬂection operator.
every U ∈ F is easy. Throughout this paper, we assume that f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is a
length-preserving permutation unless otherwise stated. Namely, for any x ∈ {0, 1}n, f (x)
is an n-bit string and the set {f (x) : x ∈ {0, 1}n} is of cardinality 2n for every n. First,
we mention some useful operators for describing the previous and our results. The tagging
operators Oj are deﬁned as follows:
Oj |x〉|y〉 =
{−|x〉|y〉 if f (y)(2j+1,2j+2) = x(2j+1,2j+2),
|x〉|y〉 if f (y)(2j+1,2j+2) = x(2j+1,2j+2),
where y(i,j) denotes the substring from the ith bit to the jth bit of the bit string y if ij
and the null string otherwise. Note that these unitary operatorsOj are easy if f is efﬁciently
computable. Next, we consider the reﬂection operatorsQj(f ) as follows:
Qj(f ) = ∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉〈x| ⊗ (2|j,x〉〈j,x | − I ),
where
|j,x〉 =
1√
2n−2j
∑
y:f (y)(1,2j)=x(1,2j)
|y〉.
Fig.1 illustrates the intuitive image of the reﬂection operator.We sometimes use the notation
Qj instead ofQj(f ).
Actually, these reﬂection operators are somewhat special for our purpose. In general,
reﬂection operators are commonly and successfully used in the Grover algorithm [9] and
the quantum amplitude ampliﬁcation technique [4].
2.2. Review of previous results
Informally speaking, a function f is said to be worst-case quantum one-way if f can be
computed by an efﬁcient quantum machine and f−1 cannot be computed by any efﬁcient
quantum machine. One of the results in [11] is the following characterization of worst-case
quantum one-way permutations.
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Theorem 1 (Kasheﬁ et al. [11]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a permutation. Then f is
worst-case quantum one-way if and only if the set Fn = {Qj(f )}j=0,1,...,n/2−1 of unitary
operators is not easy.
As a part of the proof of Theorem 1, Kasheﬁ et al. [11] give a quantum algorithm, which
we call Algorithm INV in what follows, that computes f−1(x) by using unitary operators
Oj andQj . The initial input state to INV is assumed to be
1√
2n
|x〉 ∑
y∈{0,1}n
|y〉 (= |x〉|0,x〉).
Then INV performs the following steps:
foreach j = 0 to n/2− 1
(step W.j.1) Apply Oj to the ﬁrst and the second registers;
(step W.j.2) ApplyQj to the ﬁrst and the second registers.
After each step, we have the following:(
the state after
step W.j.1
)
= 2
j
√
2n
|x〉
(√
2n−2j |j,x〉 − 2
∑
y:f (y)(1,2j+2)=x(1,2j+2)
|y〉
)
;
(
the state after
step W.j.2
)
= 2
j+1
√
2n
|x〉 ∑
y:f (y)(1,2j+2)=x(1,2j+2)
|y〉.
The above properties are with respect to “worst-case” (i.e., non-cryptographic) quantum
one-way permutations, but they also play essential roles in the case of “average-case” (i.e.,
cryptographic) quantum one-way permutations. Before reviewing a known sufﬁcient condi-
tion of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations, we deﬁne two types of cryptographic
“one-wayness” in the quantum computational setting.
Deﬁnition 2. A permutation f is weakly quantum one-way if the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
(1) f can be computed by a polynomial-size quantum circuit (and whenever inputs are
classical the corresponding outputs must be classical) with certainty; 1
(2) there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every polynomial-size quantum circuit A
and all sufﬁciently large n’s,
Pr[A(f (Un)) = Un ] > 1/p(n),
where Un is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n.
1 There are several ways to deﬁne what is the efﬁcient computation of f. We may replace “a polynomial-size
quantum circuit” in the deﬁnition by “a polynomial-size classical circuit”. This choice does not harm our results in
this paper.We note that this footnote is also applicable to our deﬁnition of strongly quantum one-way permutations.
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Deﬁnition 3. A permutation f is strongly quantum one-way if the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
(1) f can be computed by a polynomial-size quantum circuit (and whenever inputs are
classical the corresponding outputs must be classical) with certainty;
(2) for every polynomial-size quantum circuit A and every polynomial p(·) and all sufﬁ-
ciently large n’s,
Pr[A(f (Un)) = Un ] < 1/p(n).
As in the classical one-way permutations, we can show that the existence of weakly quan-
tumone-waypermutations is equivalent to that of stronglyquantumone-waypermutations. 2
Thus, we consider the weakly quantum one-way permutations in this paper. While Theo-
rem 1 is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition of worst-case quantum one-way permutations,
Kasheﬁ et al. [11] also gave a sufﬁcient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way per-
mutations by using the following notion.
Deﬁnition 4. Let d(n)n be a polynomial in n and Jn be a d(n)-qubit unitary opera-
tor. Jn is called (a(n), b(n))-pseudo identity if there exists a set Xn ⊆ {0, 1}n such that
|Xn|/2nb(n) and for every z ∈ {0, 1}n \Xn
|1− (〈z|1〈0|2)Jn(|z〉1|0〉2)|a(n),
where |z〉1 is the n-qubit basis state for each z and |0〉2 corresponds to the ancillae of d(n)−n
qubits.
The closeness between a pseudo identity operator and the identity operator is measured
by a pair of parameters a(n) and b(n). The ﬁrst parameter a(n) is a measure of a statistical
property and the second one b(n) is the ratio of “ill-behaved” elements. Note that we do
not care where each z ∈ Xn is mapped by the pseudo identity operator Jn. While we will
give a necessary and sufﬁcient condition of quantum one-way permutations by using the
notion of pseudo identity, we introduce a new notion, which may be helpful to understand
intuitions of our and previous conditions, in the following.
Deﬁnition 5. Let d ′(n)n be a polynomial in n and Pn be a d ′(n)-qubit unitary operator.
Pn is called (a(n), b(n))-pseudo reﬂection (with respect to |(z)〉) if there exists a setXn ⊆
{0, 1}n such that |Xn|/2nb(n) and for every z ∈ {0, 1}n \ Xn and every n-dimensional
vector w∣∣∣∣∣1−
(
〈z|1 ⊗ 〈w|2
( ∑
y∈{0,1}n
|y〉〈y|1⊗(2|(y)〉〈(y)|−I )2
)
⊗〈0|3
)
Pn(|z〉1|w〉2|0〉3)
∣∣∣∣∣a(n).
2 Theorem 2.3.2 in [6] states the equivalence between the existence of weakly one-way functions and that
of strongly one-way functions and holds even in the quantum case. In case of classical one-way permutations,
Theorem 2.6.2 in [6] mentions a tighter connection. You may also see [7] for the tight connection.
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Fig. 2. Pseudo reﬂection operator.
The above deﬁnition of pseudo reﬂection operators is somewhat complicated. Fig. 2
illustrates a geometrical intuition of the pseudo reﬂection operator, which may be helpful
to understand the underlying idea of Deﬁnition 5. Let Jn be a d(n)-qubit (a(n), b(n))-
pseudo identity operator. Then (In ⊗ Jn)†(Qj ⊗ Id(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jn) is a (d(n) + n)-qubit
(a′(n), b′(n))-pseudo reﬂection operator with respect to |j,x〉, where a′(n)2a(n) and
b′(n)2b(n). These estimations of a′(n) and b′(n) are too rough to obtain a necessary and
sufﬁcient condition. Rigorous estimation of these parameters is a main technical issue in
this paper.
Now, we are ready to mention results with respect to “average-case” quantum one-way
permutations shown in [11].
Theorem 6 (Kasheﬁ et al. [11]). Let f be a permutation that can be computed by a
polynomial-size quantum circuit. If f is not (weakly) quantum one-way, then for all polyno-
mials p’s and inﬁnitely many n’s, there exist a polynomial rp(n) and an rp(n)-qubit ( 12
p(n)
,
1/p(n))-pseudo identity operator Jn such that the family of pseudo reﬂection
operators
Fp,n(f ) = {(In ⊗ Jn)†(Qj (f )⊗ Irp(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jn)}j=0,1,...,n/2−1
is easy.
Note that the second parameter 1/p(n) of the pseudo identity operator stated in Theorem
6 comes from the error bound of inverting algorithms for weakly one-way quantum permu-
tations. Kasheﬁ et al. [11] conjectured that the converse of Theorem 6 should still hold and
proved a weaker version (with respect to the error bound of pseudo identity operators) of
the converse as follows.
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Theorem 7 (Kasheﬁ et al. [11]). Let f be a permutation that can be computed by a
polynomial-size quantum circuit. If for all polynomials p’s and inﬁnitely many n’s there exist
a polynomial rp(n) and an rp(n)-qubit ( 12
p(n)
, p(n)/2n)-pseudo identity operator family 3
{Jj,n}j=0,1,...,n/2−1 such that the family of pseudo reﬂection operators
Fp,n(f ) = {(In ⊗ Jj,n)†(Qj (f )⊗ Irp(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jj,n)}j=0,1,...,n/2−1
is easy, then f is not (weakly) quantum one-way.
Note that pseudo identity operators stated in Theorem 7 permit “exponentially” small
errors while pseudo identity operators that will appear in our statement permit “polyno-
mially” small errors. We mention why it is difﬁcult to show the converse of Theorem
6 (or, equivalently, the resulting statement by replacing “p(n)/2n” of Theorem 7 with
“1/p(n)”). To prove it by contradiction, all we can assume is the existence of a pseudo
identity operator. This means that we cannot know how the pseudo identity operator is
close to the identity operator. To overcome this difﬁculty, we introduce a probabilistic
technique and estimate the expected behavior of the pseudo identity operator. Eventu-
ally, we give a necessary and sufﬁcient condition of the existence of cryptographic quan-
tum one-way permutations in terms of reﬂection operators. This afﬁrmatively settles their
conjecture. We stress that results with respect to cryptographic functions are obtained by
generalizing ones with respect to non-cryptographic functions, since there are few connec-
tions between cryptographic and non-cryptographic functions in the classical computation
model.
2.3. Universal tests
In this subsection, we explain what universal tests mean. Pseudorandom bits w’s, which
are drawn according to some probability distribution, can be deﬁned as ones that pass
“all” polynomial-time computable statistical tests. Since w passes “all” polynomial-time
computable statistical tests if w passes the next bit test, the next bit test is said to be
universal for (unbiased) pseudorandom generators. On the other hand, “passing through
the next bit test” means that the next bit is computationally unpredictable from the pre-
vious bits read so far and the unpredictability is deﬁned for “all” polynomial-time al-
gorithms. In this sense, “passing through the next bit test” is just a necessary and sufﬁ-
cient condition for pseudorandom generators. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to mention
that the next bit test is a family of sub-tests which are uniformly deﬁned. Namely, the
next bit test means a family that consists of the 2nd bit test, the 3rd bit test, and so
on. After all, the advantage of the next bit test for pseudorandom generators is not only
its universality but also the fact that it is deﬁned in terms of more primitive uniform
components.
3 In the corresponding statement in [11], “single” pseudo identity operator rather than pseudo identity operator
“family” is used. On the other hand, their actual proof in [11] is for “family”, which is as strong a statement as
Theorem 7.
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We now move to universal tests for quantum one-way permutations. To test the quan-
tum one-wayness for given a permutation f, we have to consider all the polynomial-time
quantum algorithms. Theorem 1 provides a universal test for worst-case quantum one-way
permutations. Namely, f has an efﬁcient implementation of all reﬂection operators Qj ’s
with respect to f if and only if f is not one-way. The efﬁcient implementability of all Qj ’s
also means the next quantum state computability, which we have mentioned in Section 1.
Thus, we call the universal test next quantum state computability test. Note that the next
quantum state computability test for worst-case quantum one-way permutations is also de-
ﬁned in terms of more primitive uniform components as the next bit test for pseudorandom
generators is.
In this paper, we give a universal test for “cryptographic” quantum one-way permutations
by generalizing the next quantum state computability test for worst-case quantum one-way
permutations. Since, in our universal test, we do not have to compute exactly the next
quantum state, we may call our test next quantum state approximability test. Note that the
next quantum state approximability test for average-case quantum one-way permutations
is also deﬁned in terms of more primitive uniform components.
3. Necessary and sufﬁcient condition of quantum one-way permutations
We have a necessary and sufﬁcient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permu-
tations as follows.
Theorem 8. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) there exists a weakly quantum one-way permutation,
(2) there exists a polynomial-time computable function f satisfying that there exists a poly-
nomial p such that for all sufﬁciently large n’s, all polynomials rp(n)’s and all rp(n)-
qubit ( 12
p(n)
, 1/p(n))-pseudo identity operator families {Jj,n}j=0,1,...,n/2−1, the family
of pseudo reﬂection operators
Fp,n(f ) = {(In ⊗ Jj,n)†(Qj (f )⊗ Irp(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jj,n)}j=0,1,...,n/2−1
{Jj,n}j=0,1,...,n/2−1, the family of pseudo reﬂection operators is not easy.
To grasp the intuition of Theorem 8, Fig. 3 may be helpful. Theorem 8 can be proved as
the combination of Theorem 6 and the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Let f be a permutation that can be computed by a polynomial-size quantum
circuit. If for all polynomials p’s and inﬁnitely many n’s there exist a polynomial rp(n) and
an rp(n)-qubit ( 12
p(n)
, 1/p(n))-pseudo identity operator family {Jj,n}j=0,1,...,n/2−1 such
that the family of pseudo reﬂection operators
Fp,n(f ) = {Q˜j (f )} = {(In ⊗ Jj,n)†(Qj (f )⊗ Irp(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jj,n)}j=0,1,...,n/2−1
is easy, then f is not (weakly) quantum one-way.
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Fig. 3. Basic operations for the inversion.
We devote the rest of this section to the proof of Theorem 9.
Proof. Suppose that for every polynomials p(n), inﬁnitely many n’s, and some ( 12
p(n)
,
1/p(n))-pseudo identity operator family {Jj,n}j=0,1,...,n/2−1, the family Fp,n of unitary
operators is easy. Moreover, let f be a weakly quantum one-way permutation. By a prob-
abilistic argument, we show that a contradiction follows from this assumption. For more
detail, we construct an efﬁcient inverter for f using Fp,n and then, if we choose a poly-
nomial p(n) appropriately, this efﬁcient inverter can compute x from f (x) for a large
fraction of inputs, which violates the assumption that f is a weakly quantum one-way
permutation.
We ﬁrst construct a polynomial-size algorithm av-INV to invert f by using unitary opera-
tions in Fp,n. Algorithm av-INV is similar to Algorithm INV except the following change:
the operatorQj is now replaced with Q˜j . The initial input state to av-INV is also assumed
to be
1√
2n
|x〉1 ∑
y∈{0,1}n
|y〉2|0〉3,
where |z〉1 (resp., |z〉2 and |z〉3) denotes the ﬁrst n-qubit (resp., the second n-qubit and the
last (rp(n)− n)-qubit) register.
Algorithm av-INV performs the following steps:
foreach j = 0 to n/2− 1
(step j.1) Apply Oj to the ﬁrst and the second registers;
(step j.2) Apply Q˜j to all the registers.
For analysis of Algorithm av-INV, we use the following functionally equivalent description:
foreach j = 0 to n/2− 1
(step A.j.1) Apply Oj to the ﬁrst and the second registers;
(step A.j.2) Apply Jj,n to the second and third registers;
(step A.j.3) ApplyQj to the ﬁrst and the second registers;
(step A.j.4) Apply J †j,n to the second and third registers.
Then, we can prove the following two claims.
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Claim 10. Suppose that f is a weakly quantum one-way permutation, i.e., there exists a
polynomial r(n)1 such that for every polynomial-size quantum circuit A and all sufﬁ-
ciently large n’s, Pr[A(f (Un)) = Un ] > 1/r(n). Then, for every polynomial q(n) >
r1/2(n), there are at least 2n(1/r(n) − 1/q2(n))/(1 − 1/q2(n)) x’s such that A cannot
compute x from f (x) better than with probability 1− 1/q2(n).
Claim 11. Let q(n) = p1/4(n)/√2n. There are at most 2n/q(n) x’s such that Algorithm
av-INV cannot compute x from f (x) with probability at least 1− 1/q2(n).
The proof of Claim 11 is delayed and that of Claim 10 follows immediately from the
deﬁnition of a weakly quantum one-way permutation by a counting argument.
Recall that we assume that f is a weakly quantum one-way permutation at the beginning
of this proof. Now, we can set p(n) = 4n2(r(n) + 1)4, that is, q(n) = r(n) + 12. It
follows that (1/r(n) − 1/q2(n))/(1 − 1/q2(n)) > 1/q(n), which is a contradiction since
av-INV is an inverter violating the assumption of a weakly quantum one-way permutation
f. This implies that f is not weakly quantum one-way. 
In what follows, we present a proof of Claim 11 to complete the proof of Theorem 9.
Proof of Claim 11. Let Jn be a ( 12
p(n)
, 1/p(n))-pseudo identity operator. From the def-
inition of pseudo identity operators, there exists a set Xn ⊆ {0, 1}n with |Xn|2n/p(n)
such that for every y ∈ Yn = {0, 1}n \Xn,
Jn|y〉2|0〉3 = y |y〉2|0〉3 + |y〉23, (1)
where |y〉23⊥|y〉2|0〉3 and |1− y |1/2p(n).
InAlgorithm av-INV, we applyJj,n before and after step A.j.3 for each j. Each application
of a pseudo identity operator Jn ∈ {Jj,n} makes an error in computation of f−1. We call
the vector Jn|〉 − |〉 the error associated to |〉. To measure the effect of this error, we
use the following lemmas. (Lemma 13 itself was stated in [11].) We note, in the sequel, the
norm over vectors is Euclidean. 
Lemma 12. Assume that T ⊆ S ⊆ {0, 1}n. Then length l(S, T ) of the error associated to
the state
|(S, T )〉 = 1√|S|
( ∑
y∈S\T
|y〉|0〉 − ∑
y∈T
|y〉|0〉
)
satisﬁes that
l(S, T )2
√
|S ∩Xn|
|S| + (n),
where (n) is a negligible function in n.
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Proof. First, we show a property of the length of the error associated to the state |y〉|0〉.
The property is that the length is at most 2/2p(n)/2 if y ∈ Yn. From Eq. (1), if y ∈ Yn,
1− |y | |1− y |1/2p(n) and hence
||y〉|2 = 1− |y |2 = (1− |y |)(1+ |y |)2/2p(n).
Thus, we obtain the following:
|Jn|y〉|0〉 − |y〉|0〉| = |(y − 1)|y〉|0〉 + |y〉|
=
√
|y − 1|2 + ||y〉|2

√
1/22p(n) + 2/2p(n)
 2/2p(n)/2.
Using this property, we have a tight bound of l(S, T ):
l(S, T ) = |Jn|(S, T )〉 − |(S, T )〉|
= 1√|S|
∣∣∣∣∣(Jn−I )
( ∑
y∈Yn∩(S\T )
|y〉|0〉− ∑
y∈Yn∩T
|y〉|0〉+ ∑
y∈Xn∩(S\T )
|y〉|0〉− ∑
y∈Xn∩T
|y〉|0〉
)∣∣∣∣∣
 1√|S|
∣∣∣∣∣(Jn−I )
( ∑
y∈Yn∩(S\T )
|y〉|0〉− ∑
y∈Yn∩T
|y〉|0〉
)∣∣∣∣∣
+ 1√|S|
∣∣∣∣∣(Jn − I )
( ∑
y∈Xn∩(S\T )
|y〉|0〉− ∑
y∈Xn∩T
|y〉|0〉
)∣∣∣∣∣
 1√|S|
( ∑
y∈Yn∩(S\T )
|Jn|y〉|0〉−|y〉|0〉|+ ∑
y∈Yn∩T
|Jn|y〉|0〉−|y〉|0〉|
)
+ 1√|S|
(∣∣∣∣∣Jn
( ∑
y∈Xn∩(S\T )
|y〉|0〉− ∑
y∈Xn∩T
|y〉|0〉
)∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑y∈Xn∩(S\T ) |y〉|0〉−
∑
y∈Xn∩T
|y〉|0〉
∣∣∣∣∣
)
.
The ﬁrst term in the above is bounded by
2
2p(n)/2
|S ∩ Yn|√|S| <
2n+1
2p(n)/2
<
1
2n
and negligible. Since any unitarity transformations preserve the Euclidean norm, the second
term is rewritten as
2√|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑y∈Xn∩(S\T ) |y〉|0〉 −
∑
y∈Xn∩T
|y〉|0〉
∣∣∣∣∣
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and equal to
2√|S|
√
(|Xn ∩ (S \ T )| + |Xn ∩ T |) = 2
√
|S ∩Xn|
|S| .
These imply that the statement of Lemma 12 holds. 
Lemma 13. Let Jn|(S, T )〉 = |(S, T )〉 + |(S, T )⊥〉, where |(S, T )〉⊥ |(S, T )⊥〉.
Then, ||(S, T )⊥〉| l(S, T ).
By using Lemmas 12 and 13, we consider the effect of the additional applications of
pseudo identity operators to INV in order to analyze Algorithm av-INV.
For each j, we let Sx,j = {y : f (y)(1,2j) = x(1,2j)} and Tx,j = {y : f (y)(1,2j+2) =
x(1,2j+2)}. We assume that the state before step A.j.2 is
|x〉1|(Sx,j , Tx,j )〉23 = |x〉1 2
j
√
2n
( ∑
y∈Sx,j \Tx,j
|y〉2 − ∑
y∈Tx,j
|y〉2
)
|0〉3.
Note that the above state is the same as the one before step W.j.2 in Algorithm INV.
In step A.j.2, Jj,n is applied to the state. From Lemma 12 and a probabilistic argument,
we have the following.
Lemma 14. For each j,
E[ l(Sx,j , Tx,j ) ] 2√
p(n)
+ (n),
where the expectation is over x ∈ {0, 1}n and (n) is a negligible function in n.
Proof. Since f is a permutation, by the deﬁnition of Sx,j , |Sx,j | = 2n−2j . Also, y ∈ Sx,j
for some x if and only if f (y)(1,2j) = x(1,2j). Then,
Pr[ y ∈ Sx,j ] = 2
n−2j
2n
= 1
22j
,
where the probability is taken over x ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly. Thus we have, for every (1/2p(n),
1/p(n))-pseudo identity,
E[ |Xn ∩ Sx,j | ] = |Xn|22j , |Sx,j | = 2
n−2j and |Xn|
2n
= 1
p(n)
.
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It follows that
E
[ |Xn ∩ Sx,j |
|Sx,j |
]
= 1
p(n)
,
where the expectation is over x ∈ {0, 1}n. By Lemma 12,
E
[
l(Sx,j , Tx,j )
]
 2E
[√
|Xn ∩ Sx,j |
|Sx,j |
]
+ (n)
 2
√
E
[ |Xn ∩ Sx,j |
|Sx,j |
]
+ (n)
= 2√
p(n)
+ (n)
for some negligible function  as required. 
From Lemmas 13 and 14, we obtain a vector v = v1 + v2 where v1/|v1| is the unit
vector corresponding to the state before step W.j.2 in Algorithm INV and v2 is a vector of
expected length at most 2/
√
p(n) orthogonal to v1. (For simplicity, we neglect a negligible
term (n).) The vector v2 corresponds to an error that happens when Jj,n is applied before
step A.j.3.
Next, we consider the state after step A.j.3. We assume that the state after step A.j.3 is
|x〉1|(Sx,j+1,)〉23 = |x〉1 2
j
√
2n
( ∑
y∈Sx,j+1
|y〉2
)
|0〉3.
Note that the above state is the same as the one after step W.j.2 in Algorithm INV. In order
to analyze the effect of the application of J †j,n after step A.j.3, we need another lemma
similar to Lemma 14. (The proof is omitted since its proof is also similar.)
Lemma 15. For each j,
E[ l(Sx,j+1,) ] 2√
p(n)
+ (n),
where the expectation is over x ∈ {0, 1}n and (n) is a negligible function in n.
By a similar argument to the above, we obtain a vector v = v1 + v2 where v1/|v1| is
the unit vector corresponding to the state after step W.j.2 in Algorithm INV and v2 is a
vector of expected length at most 2/
√
p(n) orthogonal to v1. (For simplicity, we neglect
a negligible term (n).) The vector v2 corresponds to an error that happens when J †j,n is
applied after step A.j.3.
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From the above analysis, we can see that after the completion of Algorithm av-INV on
input x the ﬁnal state becomes v(x) = v1(x)+ v2(x) where v1(x) is parallel to
|x〉1|f−1(x)〉2|0〉3,
and v2(x) is a vector orthogonal to v1. By Lemmas 14, 15 and the linearity of expectation,
we have
E[ |v2(x)| ]2 · n2 ·
2√
p(n)
= 2n√
p(n)
 1
q2(n)
,
for q(n) = p1/4(n)/√2n, where the expectation is over x ∈ {0, 1}n. It follows that the
number of x such that |v2(x)| > 1/q(n) is at most 2n/q(n), i.e., av-INV can invert f (x) for
at least 2n(1− 1/q(n)) x’s with probability at least 1− 1/q2(n). 
4. Conclusion
By giving a proof of the conjecture posed by Kasheﬁ et al. [11], we have completed
a necessary and sufﬁcient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations in
terms of pseudo identity and reﬂection operator in this paper.
The necessary and sufﬁcient condition of quantum one-way permutations can be regarded
as a universal test for the quantum one-wayness of permutations. As far as the authors know,
this is, classical or quantum, the ﬁrst result on the universality for one-way permutations,
although the next bit test is a universal test for pseudorandom generators in the classical
computation model. We believe that our universal test for quantum one-way permutations
may help to ﬁnd good candidates for them, which are currently not known.
5. Uncited reference
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